Protocol specification and verification. In response to the need of ensuring correctness and security properties of distributed systems and system components in general, programming languages have been developed, featuring rich types such as dependent types or session types, expressive enough to specify such properties. Also, some progress has been done towards automatically proving that programs meet such specifications (often by type checking). Following this line of work, we use constructive logic to synthesize protocols from specifications, and provide tools that facilitate the use of formal methods to prove the correctness of distributed protocols based on asynchronous message passing.

Constructive logic. Constructive logic is appropriate for specifying and reasoning about distributed algorithms for two reasons. The first is that the proofs-as-programs correspondence holds for constructive logic and we want to extract correct-by-construction algorithms and protocols from our proofs. The second reason is subtler and equally important. A specification of a distributed algorithm at a high level of abstraction concentrates on specifying the information flow between the participating agents. This information can be viewed as the evidence for or knowledge of properties of the global system. Such evidence is precisely the semantics of constructive logic, so there is a natural affinity between constructive logic and specification of information flow. In reasoning about information flow it is important to reason both about the acquisition and the loss of information. For example, when information from different sources is aggregated it may be that knowledge of the source of the information is lost. Constructive logic, and in particular constructive type theory, can account for precisely what an agent may infer from evidence it has received.

The Logic of Events. We present a logical framework to reason about distributed systems called the Logic of Events. This logic has been formalized in Nuprl [1, 2]. Nuprl’s logic is a constructive type theory called Computational Type Theory (CTT). This logic allows one to reason about events and how they relate to each other via, among other things, a well-founded causal ordering on them. The Logic of Events is based on a model of message passing. An event is an abstract object corresponding to the receipt of a message at a location; the message is called primitive information of the event. A message is a triple of the following dependent type: \( \text{message} \colon \text{Type} \times \text{Type} \). For example, \( \langle \text{"this is a header"}, \mathbb{Z}, 1 \rangle \) is a message. Event orderings provide the basic structure to reason about events. An event ordering consists of a set of events, a function that associates a location with each event, a function that associates a primitive information of each event, and a causal ordering relation on events. An event ordering can be seen as a formalization of the message sequence diagrams used by protocol designers. A fundamental method for reasoning about properties of event orderings, originally pioneered by Lampert [3], is induction on the causal order. With this method we can prove both safety and liveness properties of our specifications.

Event classes. A central concept in the Logic of Events is the one of event classes, also called event observers. Event classes observe how distributed systems agents “react” on receipt of messages. Formally, an event class of type \( T \), for some type \( T \), is a function that takes an event ordering and an event in that event ordering, and returns a bag (or multiset) of elements of type \( T \). If the class \( X \) associates the bag \( \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\} \) with the event \( e \), we say that \( X \) observes the values \( v_i \)’s at \( e \). Typically, one can observe complex information by composing simple event classes. For example, a class may observe that the receipt of a certain message means that consensus has been reached. Note that different classes may observe different values at a single event. Event classes can be seen as having two facets: a logical one and a programming one. By that we mean that, (1) each event class \( X \) can be described by expressing the relation between the elements observed by \( X \) and the elements observed by \( X \)’s components (logical aspect); (2) one can extract programs from those classes we call programmable (programming aspect). Informally a class \( X \) is programmable iff there exists a corresponding program that can produce all and only the elements observed by \( X \). Such extracted programs are implementations of the corresponding classes.

Specifying and proving protocols. We developed a suite of tools and tactics in Nuprl to reason about event classes. We also developed a programming language called EventML which allows programmers to write specifications of distributed protocols. Such a specification is an event class describing the information flow of a distributed protocol. EventML features an automatic program synthesizer. In addition, it can dock to Nuprl (EventML is interpreted in Nuprl) in order to formally prove protocol properties and generate (within Nuprl) correct-by-construction programs by extraction; we say that these extracted programs are correct-by-docking.

We have specified several protocols such as a simple two-thirds consensus protocol and Paxos, and we keep improving our Nuprl tools and tactics as we prove properties of these protocols.

A simple example. Here is a toy example that we call the “ping-pong” specification (written in EventML):

```plaintext
parameter p : Loc
parameter locs : Loc Bag

internal ping "ping" Loc
internal pong "pong" Loc
input start Loc
output out Loc
import bag-map

class ReplyToPong client loc =
    let F \_ j = if loc =\_ then [out send client loc] else {} in F o pong'base ;
class SendPing loc = Output \(\{\text{pong'loc s l f}\}\) ;
class Handler (client loc) = SendPing loc
    | ReplyToPong loc ;

let F ~ client = bag-map (\loc . (client loc)) locs
in F o start'base ;
main (Delegate >>= Handler) @ \{p\} ;| ReplyToPing @ locs
```
For each of the event class combinators $C$ mentioned above, we have proved in Nuprl an equivalence relation that expresses when an element $v$ is observed by $C$. We use these lemmas to prove properties of protocols.

**Inductive logical forms.** The inductive logical form of a specification is a first order formula that characterizes completely the observations (the responses) made by the main class of the specification. The formula is inductive because it typically characterizes the responses at event $e$ in terms of observations made by a sub-component at a prior event $e' < e$. Such inductive logical forms are automatically generated in Nuprl from event class definitions, and simplified using various rewritings. With an inductive logical form we can easily prove invariants of the specification by induction on causal order. For example, fig. 1 presents the inductive logical form automatically generated for the “ping-pong” specification defined above. Our “ping-pong” specification can either observe a message produced by the Handler class (corresponding to the violet part) or by the ReplyToPing (corresponding to the blue part). If Handler observes the sending of a message $m$, it means that a “start” message has been received at location $p$ in the past and that $m$ is either a “ping” message sent to one of the locations from the bag $\text{locs}$, or a “pong” message sent in response to a “ping” message.

**Conclusion.** Our EventML tool provides a language for elegant, abstract specification of distributed algorithms that use asynchronous message passing. It is not yet suited for reasoning about concurrent shared memory systems.

It provides automated code synthesis that is correct-by-construction. It also automates major parts of the reasoning about higher-level safety and liveness properties of the specified systems, by automatically generating the inductive logical form. We are working on methods for automatic verification of invariants.

The theory underlying these tools is quite mature and the tools have already been used to carry out the verification of several non-trivial consensus algorithms. We have specified and generated code for a complete version of Lamport’s Paxos algorithm (verification of its high-level requirements is on-going, but should be complete before 2012).

**References**


